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SELLERS OF SAFE PRODUCTS SHOULD
NOT BE REQUIRED TO RESCUE USERS
FROM RISKS PRESENTED BY OTHER,
MORE DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
James A. Henderson, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a nice topic like this doing in a symposium on asbestos
litigation? Well, it happens that products liability claims seeking to extend
duties to rescue have occurred most recently in connection with asbestos
claims. In that vexing context, an en banc panel of the Washington
Supreme Court very recently overturned an appellate court and rejected
component maker liability for failure to warn of asbestos-related hazards in
products made by others. In Simonetta v. Viad Corp.,1 the court held that a
manufacturer may not be held liable for failure to warn of the dangers of
asbestos exposure resulting from the post-sale application of insulation
made by another. The court said that the defendant evaporator
manufacturer was only responsible for the "chain of distribution" of its
product, and that the addition of asbestos-containing insulation
manufactured by another company constituted a separate chain of
distribution.3 In a companion case, Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings,4 the
court rejected failure to warn claims against pump and valve manufacturers
relating to replacement packing and replacement gaskets made by others.
Earlier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached a
* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B., 1959, Princeton
University; LL.B., 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University. Research support for this article was
provided by the Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., and the Cornell Law Faculty Research
program.
1. 2008 WL 5175068 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2008).
2. See id. at *5, 10.
3. Id. at *10.
4. 2008 WL 5175083 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2008).
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similar conclusion.5 Thus, although the title of this article frames the
problem in general terms and the analysis admits of wider application, its
roots are in asbestos litigation. Consistent with the Washington Supreme
Court's decisions, this article argues that imposing liability on distributors
merely because their products are subsequently used with asbestos-
containing products made by others would clearly go too far. Moreover,
the debate surrounding the issue is sometimes unnecessarily confusing.
To begin to straighten things out, Part II explains exactly what the
problem is, and what it is not. Part II arranges the topic conceptually so that
the rest of the article can explain how courts should be handling these
product-interaction, rescue-by-warning claims. Part III then demonstrates
that courts in a wide variety of contexts courts have traditionally refused to
require one group of actors to perform "watchdog" functions over the risky
conduct of a second group in order to rescue victims of the second group
from harm. These traditional lines of decision strongly suggest that courts
should show similar restraint in connection with failure-to-warn claims in
products liability. Part IV develops the policy reasons why expanded duties
to rescue via warnings are inappropriate in the products liability cases of
interest here. Assigning watchdog responsibilities to the sellers of safe,
nondefective products will achieve neither the instrumental objective of
efficiency nor the noninstrumental objective of doing justice between the
parties. Part IV then proposes a no-duty rule with which to sort out these
product-interaction claims. The article concludes that, while it is
understandably tempting for courts to try accomplish rescue to give
asbestos plaintiffs new financial resources on which to draw, courts must
resist the temptation in this instance.
II. WHAT THE PROBLEM Is-AND WHAT IT Is NOT
A simple hypothetical illustrates the factual situations of interest here.
Suppose that M manufacturers swimsuits and that M knows that wearers of
its suits will swim in a variety of swimming pools, both above-ground and
in-ground. Assume further that some of the risks generally associated with
swimming pool usage are neither obvious nor generally known to
swimmers-for example, the risks of attempting head-first dives into
shallow, above-ground pools-and that M does not mention these risks in
5. See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005) (Ohio law). The
central issue in Lindstrom was causation as it related to component parts rather than the existence
of a duty. The court found no causation, concluding that a manufacturer cannot be held
responsible for asbestos contained in another product. See id. at 496.
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marketing its swimsuits. 6 Assume finally that V, wearing one of M's suits,
attempts a shallow dive into an above-ground pool, manufactured by P, and
suffers spinal cord injury. Does V have a viable claim 7 against M, the
swimsuit manufacturer, for failing to warn V of the risks of shallow dives?
P, the pool manufacturer, may be liable to V,8 but is A? One's first reaction
to this hypothetical may be that it is academically unrealistic-that no court
in its right mind would consider holding M liable on these assumed facts.
But courts recently have, in fact, been presented with failure-to-warn claims
of this sort. As observed at the outset, these new cases do not involve
swimsuits made by M, but nondefective pumps and valves, and P's
products are not above-ground pools, but asbestos gaskets and insulation
materials applied internally and externally to A's pumps and valves upon
their post-sale installation.9 More will be said about these actual cases
subsequently; the point here is that the swimsuit hypothetical cannot be
dismissed summarily as being academic.
Even if variations on the swimsuit claim may actually arise in
litigation, they may be likely to strike many observers as manifestly weak
on the merits. If this assessment is accurate, wherein, exactly, does the
weakness lie? The inquiry here is not whether, after thorough analysis, this
initial assessment of weakness is borne out. Later discussions in this
article, based on precedents and public policy, argue that it is. Rather, the
objective for the moment is to test the adequacy of attempts to deal with the
swimsuit claim dismissively. Something about the swimsuit claim is
clearly strange. But may the strangeness be captured in a simple turn of
phrase? For example, one might attempt to dismiss such a claim on the
ground that there is nothing wrong with the swimsuit-that there is no
evidence that the swimsuit was defective in any way. But this response
overlooks the legal basis of V's claim-if the swimsuit lacks a required
warning about diving in shallow water, it is defective for that reason.
Technically, the assertion of nondefectiveness simply begs the question of
M's failure to warn, the very basis of V's claim.
Another dismissive response might be that the swimsuit did not
actually or proximately cause V's broken neck-the swimsuit did not
induce V to attempt the shallow dive. Once again, however, this response
6. The reader may balk at the idea that the risks of diving into shallow water are neither
obvious nor generally known, but a number of courts have held otherwise. See, e.g., Corbin v.
Coleco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 411,420 (7th Cir. 1984).
7. By "viable claim" I mean one that survives a defendant's motion for summary judgment.
See, e.g., id.
8. See, e.g., Klen v. Asahi Pool Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), appeal
denied, sub nom. Klen v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. 1995).
9. See Braaten, 2008 WL 5175083; Simonetta, 2008 WL 5175068.
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overlooks the fact that the swimsuit was presumably a necessary, but-for
condition of V's going swimming in the first place-even if the suit did not
induce V to dive, it made it possible for him to do so-and is therefore a
but-for cause-in-fact of V's accident1l And if M failed to warn about the
risks of diving, that failure could be found by a jury to be a proximate cause
of V's injuries. I I
Yet another response might be that no warning need be given because
the risks of diving in shallow water are obvious. But this response ignores
the explicit assumption of non-obviousness at the outset-a minority of
courts have held pool manufacturers liable for failing to warn swimmers of
the risks of diving into shallow above-ground pools. 12 To be sure, some
swimsuit-type claims can be dismissed on the ground that the relevant risk
is obvious-suppose that V's claim were that M failed to warn about the
risk of drowning in a pool full of water. The general risk of drowning is
obvious enough that it need not be warned about, either by M or by p. 13
But not all of these rescue-by-warning cases can be dismissed on the basis
of the obviousness of the relevant risks.
14
Regarding most of these dismissive responses to the failure-to-warn
claim presented in the swimsuit hypothetical, their inadequacies reside in
their failure to take sufficient account of the foundational premise of V's
claim-that M owes V a duty to warn about the risks of shallow diving.
Only by attacking the premise of M's duty to warn may M disentangle itself
from the doctrinal web of "defect combined with causation" revealed in this
discussion. Responding that the risks are obvious may attack the duty
10. Most courts apply variations of the test, "but for the defendant having acted at all, would
the plaintiff nevertheless have suffered the same harm?" See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL.,
THE TORTS PROCESS 105 (7th ed. 2007). If the answer is "No," the defendant's conduct is a but-
for cause-in-fact of plaintiffs harm. Presumably V would not have been swimming in the first
place without the swimsuit. Id.
11. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 405-06 (6th ed. 2008).
12. See, e.g., Corbin v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 411, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing
summary judgment in favor of pool manufacturer and allowing jury to consider whether a warning
would have deterred plaintiff from diving); Klen v. Asahi Pool Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1360, 1369-70
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, sub nom. Klen v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 649 N.E.2d
417 (I11. 1995) (affirming the trial court's ruling that it was for jury to decide whether danger of
diving into above-ground pool was open and obvious to 14-year-old); Jonathan v. Kvaal, 403
N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing summary judgment in favor of pool
manufacturer). But see Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich.
1992) (summary judgment for defendants affirmed), reh'g denied, sub nom. Horan v. Coleco
Indus., 495 N.W.2d 388 (Mich. 1992).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998). Section 2 also
offers Illustration 12, in which a ladder manufacturer need not warn of the risks of setting up a
ladder in front of an unlocked door. Id.
14. See, e.g., Klen, 649 N.E.2d at 1369-70.
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premise, but it falls short because it does not defeat A's duty in every
case. 15
Of all of the other ways of couching a no-duty response, the most
commonly encountered is "A manufacturer owes no duty to warn about the
risks presented by another manufacturer's product."' 6 On the face of it, this
assertion is powerful. Not only does it reject the strange, instinctively
questionable notion that a swimsuit manufacturer might owe a duty to warn
of the risks presented by a swimsuit wearer's diving into a shallow, above-
ground pool; but it also refers directly to, and attempts to negate, the more
general proposition that one manufacturer should perform a watchdog
function to rescue its product users from risks created by other products.
Upon further reflection, however, the problem with this often-encountered
assertion is that it proves too much. Thus, in order to fulfill its duty to warn
about the risks presented by its own product, a manufacturer may
legitimately be required to warn about the risks to which another product
contributes when its own product and the other product are combined
interactively in use. In the swimsuit hypothetical, for example, suppose the
fabric out of which the swimsuit is made reacts caustically and harmfully
when the pool water contains an abnormally high concentration of chlorine?
Even if the pool manufacturer or the chlorine manufacturer must warn
about the risks of high-chlorine-content pool water,' 7 the swimsuit
manufacturer may also owe a duty to warn about the risk of a caustic
interaction between the swimsuit fabric and the chlorine.18 Although such a
warning could be said to be a warning "about the risks presented by another
manufacturer's product"-i.e., the pool and the chlorine-the non-obvious
risks presented by the swimsuit fabric may be sufficient to require a
warning from the swimsuit manufacturer. 19
This last-described, "caustic interaction" variation on the swimsuit
hypothetical involves non-obvious risks presented by a synergistic
combination of two different products-the swimsuit and the above-ground
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., John W. Petereit, The Duty Problem with Liability Claims Against One
Manufacturer for Failing to Warn About Another Manufacturer's Product, TOxic TORTS &
ENVTL. L. COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (DRI, Chicago, Ill.), Winter 2005, at 5-9.
17. One question would be whether the risks of high chlorine-content water are obvious to
reasonable persons. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998). The
other would be whether the pool manufacturer, rather than simply the chlorine distributor, owes a
duty to warn. This article addresses the latter issue.
18. See, e.g., Vail v. KMart Corp., 25 A.D.3d 549, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (stating that
clothing manufacturer could have duty to warn of especially flammable garment fabric); Bigham
v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892, 895-96 (Minn. 1978) (affirming manufacturer liability for
garments' "melt and cling" characteristics).
19. See Vail, 25 A.D.3d at 551.
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pool-giving rise to a legitimate duty to warn on the part of both
manufacturers.2 °
Faced with such synergistic product interactions, some courts have
selected one manufacturer to bear the entire responsibility to provide a
warning, based on circumstances that render warnings by the other
manufacturer relatively more difficult and ineffectual. 2 But even there, the
manufacturer required to warn may be said to be warning, to some extent,
"about the risks presented by another manufacturer's product." By contrast,
in the original swimsuit hypothetical involving the shallow dive, no
synergism is present. The swimsuit itself does not interact synergistically
with the shallowness of the swimming pool to increase the risk of a
dangerous dive.22 Nor, in the asbestos cases alluded to earlier, does a pump
interact synergistically with the asbestos that a purchaser adds internally or
externally after sale.23 Thus, the earlier-noted strangeness of imposing a
duty on the swimsuit or the pump manufacturer to warn about the risks of
diving or covering the pump with asbestos derives from the fact that the
only connection between the swimsuit and the pump, on the one hand, and
the injury to the plaintiff, on the other, was a but-for, condition-precedent
connection. In that instance, the swimsuit and the pump manufacturer are
being asked to warn about the risks presented entirely (nonsynergistically)
by another manufacturer's product.
It follows that in deciding when a manufacturer should warn about
another manufacturer's product, a line must be drawn between those
situations in which two (or more) products interact synergistically to create
joint risks greater in magnitude than the sum of the risks measured
separately, and those in which they do not. Later discussions in Part IV
consider more precisely how, and why, such a line must be drawn. Those
discussions necessarily touch upon how courts should deal with the concept
of duty. For now, two conclusions follow from what has been said so far.
First, simple, dismissive explanations, such as a manufacturer never being
required to warn about other manufacturers' products, will not suffice; a
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998); supra notes 13,
17 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 752 F.2d 295, 301 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that automobile manufacturer did not have a duty to warn of mis-match between bumper and
bumper hitch, but hitch lessor owed duty to warn user-lessee); Persons v. Salomon N. Am., Inc.,
265 Cal. Rptr. 773, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that ski binding manufacturer owed no duty
to warn of mis-match between binding and ski boot, but ski rental agency owed duty to warn
skier).
22. The swimsuit may be a necessary, but-for condition to the swimmers attempting such a
dive, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, but once in place, the swimsuit does not increase
the risk of the swimmer making such an attempt.
23. See Braaten, 2008 WL 5175083, at *3.
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duty may be imposed when two different products interact synergistically to
create joint risks. And second, when courts cross the line and impose
failure-to-warn liability on one manufacturer for the risks presented entirely
and nonsynergistically by the products of another manufacturer, the former
is being required to perform a watchdog function in order to rescue product
users from risks it had no active part in. creating and over which it cannot
exert meaningful control.24 These cases do not involve "pure rescue"
because the watchdog manufacturer's product is a but-for cause-in-fact of
the tort plaintiffs being put at risk, but they clearly involve "rescue" in a
meaningful sense of the term.25  Part III, which follows immediately,
describes a number of analogous contexts in which courts have refused to
impose such a watchdog status on defendants, strongly suggesting, in the
aggregate, that doing so in this products liability context would likewise be
inappropriate.
III. COURTS HAVE TRADITIONALLY REFUSED TO REQUIRE ACTORS TO
PERFORM WATCHDOG FUNCTIONS IN ORDER TO RESCUE VICTIMS
FROM RISKS CREATED AND CONTROLLED BY OTHERS
Each example about to be considered does not necessarily and
independently justify the denial of plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims in the
swimsuit/diving and pump/asbestos cases of primary interest here. Instead,
the objective is to show a consistent pattern of decisions, supported by
recurring policy considerations, that point strongly in that direction. At the
very least, plaintiffs in the cases being considered in this article bear a
heavy burden of showing that allowing them to recover will promote the
26
objectives of fairness and efficiency believed to underlie the tort system.
24. See, e.g., S. Agency Co. v. Hampton Bank of St. Louis, 452 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Mo. 1970).
25. So-called "pure rescue" occurs when the rescuer has had no part whatever in causing the
need for rescue, and the one needing rescue is a total stranger. Were courts to impose a duty to
engage in pure rescue, it would be referred to as a "general duty to rescue." See HENDERSON ET
AL., supra note 10, at 230. In the cases of interest here, technically the defendants are causes -in-
fact of the plaintiffs' need to be rescued. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. But the
causal links here are more attenuated than in the cases in which courts have traditionally imposed
a duty to rescue. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. For more on the essence of rescue see
infra note 36 and accompanying text.
26. For a summary of the policies underlying tort see HENDERSON, ET AL., supra note 10, at
34-37.
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A. Examples From Outside the Products Liability System
1. The Traditional Judicial Bias Against a General Duty to Rescue
Every student of American tort law knows that American courts will
not impose a legal duty to rescue another merely because the would-be
rescuer knows that the other requires help that the rescuer is in a position to
render.27 Under this rule, the mere fact that a swimsuit manufacturer is in a
position to warn about diving does not justify imposing a legal duty to do
so. 28 Of course, this "no general duty to rescue" rule is subject to a number
of exceptions, which may seem so numerous as to swallow the rule.29
Because one of these exceptions applies when an actor knows that her
conduct (whether or not tortious) has helped to place another in the position
of requiring rescue, technically the claims of primary interest in this article
are not "pure rescue" claims.30  Thus, the swimsuit manufacturer in the
earlier hypothetical knows that its product has in fact contributed, albeit
passively and non-tortiously, to placing the swimmer in a position where he
may be injured while attempting a shallow dive. Likewise, the pump
manufacturer knows that it has created a predicate for the post-sale
application of dangerous, asbestos-containing fire retardants.3" But the
leading cases establishing the cause-in-fact exception to the no-duty-to-
rescue rule are distinguishable from the swimsuit and pump cases in ways
that would justify courts in rejecting duty-to-rescue arguments in the latter
circumstances.32 Thus, while the general rule against imposing a duty to
rescue does not, by itself, warrant denying the claims in these cases, neither
does the exception based on actual causation require courts to recognize
those claims.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM, § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM, § 37 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
29. See id. §§ 38-44.
30. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 34-37. A leading case on the cause-in-fact
exception is Tubbs v. Argus, 225 N.E.2d 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967).
31. See Simonetta, 2008 WL 5175068, at *2.
32. In Tubbs v. Argus, the defendant was the driver of an automobile who crashed the vehicle
and injured the plaintiff, a passenger, placing her in need of rescue. 225 N.E.2d at 841. Because
of Indiana's guest law, the defendant was not liable in tort for causing the plaintiffs initial
injuries. Id. at 842. But the appellate court reversed a demurrer below on the plaintiff's claim that
the defendant breached his duty to rescue after the accident. Id. at 843. Compared with those
facts, the cases of interest here involve more attenuated causal links between the defendant's sale
of a nondefective product and the plaintiffs need to be rescued from a more dangerous, defective
product. See, e.g., Simonetta, 2008 WL 5175068, at * 3-4.
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For present purposes the main relevance of the strong judicial tradition
against imposing legal duties to rescue, then, resides in the policy reasons
supporting the general no-duty rule. From an instrumental efficiency
perspective, courts and commentators doubt that such a rule would
encourage rescue, and fear that it might actually discourage it.33 And from
the non-instrumental fairness perspective, courts and commentators feel that
imposing an objective standard of reasonableness in judging would-be
rescuers' conduct would unfairly punish those who are subjectively
incapable of responding to such a duty.34 Moreover, the unavoidable
vagueness of such a standard would lead to arbitrary, emotion-driven
outcomes at trial that would undermine shared notions of fair play.35 When
courts insist that product sellers warn of the hidden risks of their own
products, rescue does not come into play.36 But in the cases of interest here,
when a court asks a manufacturer to warn about risks created entirely and
nonsynergistically by other, more dangerous products, rescue is clearly
involved and the traditional bias against requiring rescue strongly suggests
that such a duty to warn should not be imposed.
2. The Traditional Refusal of Courts to Require Banks to Act as
Watchdogs Regarding Their Customers' Financial Transactions
When a fiduciary establishes a trust account in a bank and thereafter
writes checks to himself individually in the course of embezzling trust
assets, does the bank owe the beneficiaries a duty to warn them of what the
fiduciary appears to be doing? Most courts that have considered the
question have refused to impose such a duty. 37 Not only are the check-
33. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 354-62 (Cal. 1976) (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting); infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 94 (1978).
34. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 935
(1982).
35. Id. at912.
36. One could, of course, speak of all tort duties in terms of rescue. A person driving
recklessly fast could be said to owe a duty to rescue others from the risks of his driving by slowing
down to a reasonable speed. But such a driver is held for misfeasance, not nonfeasance. In
essence, rescue involves a duty to act to prevent harm that is threatened entirely from external
circumstances, including the conduct of others.
37. See, e.g., Matter of Knox, 64 N.Y.2d 434, 438 (N.Y. 1985) ("A bank is not in the normal
course required to conduct an investigation to protect funds from possible misappropriation by a
fiduciary .... "); Helig Trust & Beneficiaries v. First Interstate Bank of Wash., 969 P.2d 1082,
1085 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 2d 1998) (holding that without actual knowledge of trustee's breach of
fiduciary duty, bank had no duty to notify beneficiaries of trustee's withdrawals).
2008]
HeinOnline -- 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 603 2008
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
writing actions of the fiduciary almost always ambiguous-there may be
innocent explanations for such admittedly questionable transactions-but
also the costs of imposing open-ended watchdog responsibilities on banks
are likely to be great.38 In the end, such a duty to warn based on ambiguous
appearances of impropriety would translate into insurers' liability for
fiduciary self-dealing, which banks would simply treat as a cost of doing
business and pass on to all of their customers. Of course, if a bank becomes
more actively involved in assisting a fiduciary in committing a breach of
trust, exposure to liability may be appropriate. 39  But as a general rule,
courts refuse to require banks to monitor checking account activities in a
watchdog capacity.4 °
One interesting (and timely) exception to this reluctance to assign
watchdog status to banks and other financial institutions is the United States
Patriot Act,41 aimed at helping to prevent terrorism activities after the
September 11, 2001, attacks. The Patriot Act amends the Bank Secrecy
Act,42 requiring financial institutions to establish anti-money laundering
programs in order to inhibit the financing of terrorism. 43  Under 2003
amendments to regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act,
financial institutions are required to report to a designated federal officer or
agency any and all suspicious transactions that appear to involve money
laundering or the financing of terrorist activity.44 Clearly, the Patriot Act
requires these financial institutions to perform watchdog functions in
relation to their customers' activities.45  Does this suggest that the
traditional reluctance to assign such responsibilities is undergoing a
significant sea change that might call for a reassessment of the thesis that
American law is biased against turning banks into watchdogs? Three
important considerations suggest that no such broad-scale change is
underway. First, the Bank Secrecy Act regulations and related customs in
the relevant industries define the concept of suspicious activities with
38. See, e.g., Helig Trust, 969 P.2d at 1084.
39. See, e.g., S. Agency Co. v. Hampton Bank of St. Louis, 452 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Mo. 1970)
("[A]ctual notice of misappropriation or conduct amounting to bad faith on the part of the bank
must be shown in order. . . to recover.").
40. See id.
41. H.R. 3162, 107 Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 24, 2001).
42. Pub. L. 91-508, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§1951-1959, and
31 U.S.C. §§5311-5314; 5316-5332.
43. Cheryl R. Lee, Constitutional Cash: Are Banks Guilty of Racial Profiling in
Implementing the United States Patriot Act?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 557 (2006).
44. 31 C.F.R. Part 103, 68 Fed. Reg. 65392 et seq. (Nov. 20, 2003).
45. See Maureen A. Young, New Developments and Compliance Issues in a Security
Conscious World, 866 PLI/Pat 347 (2006).
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relative specificity. 46 Second, the extraordinary background circumstances
-helping in the fight against international terrorism-suggest that the
approach under the Patriot Act will not be transported to other, more
pedestrian financial contexts. And finally, notwithstanding the strong
national-security justifications supporting the Patriot Act, the suspicious-
activity reporting under the Act has proven to be costly and controversial.47
3. The Traditional Refusal of Courts to Require Defendants to Warn
Others of the Proclivities of Relatives and Close Associates to
Engage in Sexually Abusive Behavior
When a wife knows that her husband has, in the past, shown a
predilection to molest children sexually, and she knows that he will find
himself in circumstances that provide him the opportunity to repeat such
abusive behavior, does the wife owe a legal duty to warn the children
thereby placed at risk, or the children's parents? Because the facts are
emotionally charged and the case for rescue is ostensibly compelling, such
a circumstance provides a good test of the hypothesis that courts are
generally biased against compelling actors to perform watchdog functions.
Consistent with a strong no-duty-to-rescue tradition, most courts in such
cases refuse to recognize a duty to warn.48 Among the reasons given for
this response are the absence of a preexisting personal relationship between
the would-be rescuer and the victim; 49 the lack of custody or control of the
rescuer over the victim; 50 the absence of any "just and sensible legal
guidelines;, 51 and the virtual impossibility of defining a sensible starting or
46. 31 C.F.R. § 103.17 (setting a threshold on transactions involving at least $5,000); 31
C.F.R. § 103.17(a)(2) (requiring reporting if a specified financial institution knows, suspects, or
has reason to suspect that a transaction is one of four classes of transactions enumerated in the
regulations).
47. See, e.g., Christopher J. Zinski, Patriotism, Secrecy and the Long Arm of the Law, 124
BANKING L.J. 457 (2007) (arguing that criminals know how to avoid detection); Maureen A.
Young, New Developments and Compliance Issues in a Security Conscious World, 866 PLI/Pat
347 (2006) (describing litany of problems); Cheryl R. Lee, supra note 43, at 557 (noting that
financial returns on SARs have been meager).
48. See, e.g., Eric J. v. Betty M., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (ruling that, where
parolee molested girlfriend's eight-year-old son, parolee's family owed no duty to warn girlfriend
of parolee's felony conviction for child molestation); D.W. v. Bliss, 112 P.3d 232, 242 (Kan.
2005) (holding wife not liable for failing to warn 15-year-old boy of her husband's prior sexual
activities with men in her home); Meyer v. Lindala, 675 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that religious congregation in which both plaintiffs and their sexual abuser were members
owed no duty to warn based on knowledge of prior sexual offenses perpetrated by abuser).
49. See Meyer, 675 N.W.2d at 641.
50. See Bliss, 112 P.3d at 242.
51. See Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906, 915 (Wis. 2000).
2008]
HeinOnline -- 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 605 2008
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
stopping point for such liability. 52  A minority of courts have allowed
plaintiffs to succeed with failure-to-warn claims in these cases.53 Among
the minority decisions imposing liability for failure to warn of the risk of
child abuse, some courts rely on child abuse reporting statutes. 54  For
example, a decision for the plaintiffs by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
relies on the fact that its statute applies to "any person 'having reasonable
cause to believe"' that a child has been subject to abuse.55
4. One Controversial Exception to the General Rule: The Tarasoff
Decision in California
More than thirty years ago the Supreme Court of California imposed
liability on a psychologist for failing to warn a young woman that a patient
had confided his intentions to the therapist to kill the woman.56 The
majority of the court reasoned that, although the therapist and the victim
were strangers, the relationship between the therapist and his patient gave
rise to a duty to warn the victim and her parents of her imminent peril.
57
Based on the traditional criteria developed in the child abuse cases in the
preceding section, the court should have denied the plaintiffs claims
against the psychologist, who had no preexisting relationship with the
victim, did not cause the victim's predicament, and did not control his
patient's behavior.58 It appears that the defendant's status as a professional,
combined with the unique opportunity to warn presented by the facts, led a
majority of the court to base a duty to warn merely on the opportunity to do
so, in direct conflict with the Restatement of Torts, Second.59 One Justice
concurred in the result only to the extent that it rested on the circumstance
that the defendant therapist had actually predicted that his patient would kill
the victim; the concurrence insisted that no duty to use reasonable care in
reaching that assessment should be imposed. 60 And one Justice dissented
on the ground that "[o]verwhelming policy considerations weigh against
52. See Kelli T-G. v. Charland, 542 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
53. See, e.g., Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1996) (grandmother
liable when grandfather abused granddaughter).
54. See J.S. & M.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 931 (N.J. 1998).
55. Id.
56. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
57. See id. at 343-44. The Restatement view is reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 314.
58. See supra note 48.
59. This is the author's assessment of the holding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314.
60. See Tarasoff, P.2d at 353-54, (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against
harm."6'
The policy reasons offered by the dissenting Justice in Tarasoff are
relevant to this general discussion of the duty to rescue. According to the
dissent, threatening therapists with liability for failing to warn will not serve
to increase public safety; those in need of therapy will not seek it so readily,
nor will therapy be as effective as it otherwise might.62 Moreover,
therapists will respond to such a duty by committing greater numbers of
patients to civil confinement, thereby significantly increasing the relevant
social costs. 63 Surprisingly, in light of the analysis in this article, a majority
of courts that have addressed the issue have followed Tarasoff64 although
several have narrowed the holding to reduce possible open-endedness.65
Has the duty imposed by Tarasoff and its progeny had the adverse effects
that the dissenting Justice predicted? Some writers insist that Tarasoff has
generated negative effects.66 Others reach opposite conclusions.67 In recent
years, several state legislatures have codified the holding, almost always
narrowing the duty to make outcomes more predictable.68 On any fair
assessment, Tarasoff has proven to be controversial, and does not appear to
have spawned similar duties in areas other than psychotherapy. The
decision is useful in the context of this article mainly because it reveals how
non-traditional extensions of duties to rescue by warning are likely to stir
up controversy when, on rare occasions, they are made. And the dissent in
Tarasoff provides an eloquent essay on how and why extending duties to
rescue may prove to be wasteful, ineffectual, and downright
counterproductive.69
61. See id. 355 (Clark, J., dissenting).
62. See id. 359-60 (Clark, J., dissenting).
63. See id. 361-62 (Clark, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Shuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988); Estates of Morgan v.
Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1320-22 (Ohio 1997). But see Nasser v.
Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1995). See also Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV.
97, 98-100 (1994).
65. See, e.g., Thompson v. Alameda County, 614 P.2d 728, 738 (Cal. 1980) (stating that duty
to warn is triggered only when a therapist is aware of specific threats to specific victims).
66. See, e.g., Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard
Society, 90 HARV. L. REv. 358 (1976); Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A
Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REv. 165, 166
(1978).
67. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Victimology and Mental Health: An Agenda, 66 VA. L. REV.
681, 683-84 (1980); Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443 (1984).
68. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16(b) (West 2000).
69. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 354 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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B. Examples From Within the Products Liability System
1. The Traditional Rule That Repairers Need Not Warn of Other
Risks Presented by the Products They Repair
The general rule is that product repairers provide services, for which
they are liable only when proven negligent.7 ° When they supply component
parts they may be strictly liable for defects;7' but repairs, as such, constitute
services. 72 Consequently, the issue here is not one of strict liability versus
negligence, but whether a repairer's duty of care includes the duty to warn
product owners and users about non-obvious risks, not relating to the repair,
which the repairer discovers during his work.73 Even though it might be
argued that such a duty is owed, given that the repairer often has a
preexisting (and perhaps an on-going) relationship with the product owner
or user who hires him, courts have refused to impose a general duty to warn
on repairers in such circumstances.74 The main reasons advanced by the
courts for such refusals are the open-endedness and vagueness of the
responsibilities to inspect and report that a duty to warn would place on
repairers, and the substantial financial costs that such a duty would
generate, both in searching for defects and insuring against what would in
fact amount to strict liability, that customers of repairers would ultimately
be forced to bear.
75
2. The Traditional Rule That Pharmacists Need Not Warn of Risks
Presented by the Prescription Products They Dispense
What makes this traditional limit on the duty to warn unusual is that it
applies to commercial entities that are clearly in the business of selling
products, and that frequently have ongoing relationships with their
customers.76 The general rule is that pharmacists are strictly liable for harm
caused by manufacturing defects in the prescription products they dispense,
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19 cmt. f(1998).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
74. Id. at 162 (finding no duty on part of repairer to correct or warn of defects on other
portions of remote-controlled gate); Ayala v. V. & 0. Press Co., 126 A.D.2d 229 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) (no duty to warn of design defect in machine being repaired).
75. See Seo, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168.
76. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998).
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to the same extent as are commercial retailers of nonprescription products;17
but pharmacists are otherwise liable to their customers only if proven
negligent.78 Courts conceptualize the latter portion of this traditional
approach by asserting that pharmacists primarily provide a service in regard
to prescription products, but courts do not explain how that assertion is
consistent with imposing strict liability for harm caused by manufacturing
defects in such products. In any event, the issue of primary importance here
is whether a pharmacist's duty of care includes a duty to warn customers of
the non-obvious risks presented by prescription products. Clearly
pharmacists must exercise reasonable care to fill prescriptions correctly and
to pass on any warnings to customers supplied by manufacturers. 79 But do
they owe a duty to use care to protect patients against misprescription in the
sense that the wrong drug or device has been prescribed for a particular
customer, or that two or more drugs will prove dangerous if taken together
by the same customer? Must a pharmacist exercise reasonable care to alert
customers that they may have developed a dependence on prescription
drugs that may lead to addiction over time?
The traditional response to these questions is "No"-pharmacists do
not owe their customers a duty to serve as watchdogs over the decisions of
physicians regarding which drugs and medical devices to prescribe to which
patients; they are not liable for injuries so long as prescriptions are
accurately filled.80 This general rule is subject to sensible exceptions.
Thus, courts have held that pharmacists owe a duty to be alert for obvious
errors on the face of the prescription. 81 And when pharmacists voluntarily
undertake to warn customers of side effects of medications, or risks from
drug interactions, they must do so reasonably.82 Moreover, if a pharmacist
has specific factual information about a particular customer that would
cause a reasonable person to realize that the customer is at greater than
normal risk, a court may recognize a duty to warn that customer.8 3 The
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(e)(1) (1998).
78. Id. § 6(e)(2).
79. Id. § 6 cmt. h, illus. 4.
80. See, e.g., Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 461-66 (Tex. App. 2000);
Johnson v. Walgreen Co., 675 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
81. See, e.g., McKee v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Wash. 1989); Homer
v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 521-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (prescription called for three times the
normal dosage).
82. See, e.g., Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 821-22 (Mass. 2002) (pharmacy
voluntarily distributed list of potential side effects; duty to warn customers that list was not
exhaustive); Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (pharmacy
advertising that it had established a drug-interaction database to protect customers), appeal
denied, 588 N.W.2d 725 (Mich. 1997).
83. See, e.g., Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1124-25 (Ill. 2002)
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major reason that courts give for adhering to the basic rule of no duty to
warn is that courts do not wish to force pharmacists to second-guess the
judgments of prescribing physicians, or to interfere with the physician-
patient relationship. 84  At a deeper level, undoubtedly, the reasons are
similar to those already observed in other legal contexts: imposing a duty to
monitor and warn would not add very much to customer safety, given the
reliance of patients on their physicians, and might actually increase risk.85
And requiring pharmacists to monitor prescriptions would greatly increase
customer costs.
86
3. The Traditional Rule That Trademark Licensors Need Not Police
Their Trademarks Nor Protect Purchasers From the Risks
Presented by the Products to Which Their Trademarks Are
Attached
When the owner of a well-known trademark licenses its logo to be
attached to a product it has neither manufactured nor distributed and over
which it exerts no control, does it owe a duty to police the trademark in
order to protect purchasers from non-obvious risks presented by the
product? Even though the logo may be a major reason why many persons
purchase the product; and even though product purchasers may assume that
the trademark licensor has distributed, or at least vouches for, the product;
the traditional rule is that the trademark licensor who does not participate in
the manufacture or distribution of the product owes no duty to rescue the
purchasers by warning them of hidden, non-obvious risks, whether or not
the licensor knows that the risks exist and are significant.87 By contrast,
when trademark licensors do participate in the distribution of the products
to which their trademarks attach, they are liable as sellers for any
shortcomings in the manufacture, design and marketing of the products. 88
(pharmacy knew of customer's allergies and of risks that drug posed for her); Lasley v. Shrake's
Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (failure to warn
customer of risk of dependency over 30-year period of taking drug).
84. See, e.g., McKee, 782 P.2d at 1051 ("Requiring the pharmacist to warn of potential risks
associated with a drug would interject the pharmacist into the physician-patient relationship and
interfere with ongoing treatment.").
85. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 88 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
("Interference in the patient-physician relationship can only do more harm than good.").
86. See, e.g., McKee, 782 P.2d at 1055 (requiring pharmacists to supply customers with all
package insert material would impose "the economic and logistic burden of copying the inserts as
well as developing a storage, filing and retrieval system to ensure the current insert is dispensed
with the proper drug.").
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 14 cmt. d (1998).
88. Id.; see, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 786 P.2d 939, 946-47 (Ariz.
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These rules governing trademark licensor liability conform to the patterns
reflected in previously considered examples of courts refusing to require
commercial actors to perform watchdog (or, in this context, policing)
functions.89 When the trademark licensor lacks control over the distribution
of the product, the questionable gains in safety from imposing a duty on the
licensor are presumably outweighed by the costs of doing so. 9°
4. The Traditional Rule That Component Part Manufacturers Need
Not Monitor Use of Their Components by Subsequent
Manufacturers who Combine Those Components With Others to
Produce Dangerous End-Products
When the manufacturer of a nondefective component part supplies the
part to another manufacturer who combines it with other components to
produce a defectively dangerous end-product, is the component part
supplier liable to those who are harmed by the defective design of the end-
product? Parallel to their treatment of trademark licensors, 91 courts
generally refuse to impose responsibility on component part suppliers to
monitor the end-uses of their components and to rescue, via warnings, those
exposed to risks created by the integration of those components into
dangerous end-products. 92  This no-duty rule applies even though the
component part directly and synergistically contributes to the risks of injury
presented by the end-product, and whether or not the component part
manufacturer knows or should know that its component part is contributing
to those risks.93 If the component supplier substantially participates in the
integration of the component into the design of the end-product, the
supplier will be liable. 94 But not otherwise, even though the component
combines with other components synergistically to create joint risks in the
end-product. 95 Whether an exception to this no-duty rule should be made
for unusual circumstances, as when a component supplier knows that its
purchaser (the manufacturer of the integrated end-product) lacks expertise
1990).
89. See supra Part III.A.
90. See supra notes 28, 36, 46-48 and accompanying text.
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 14 cmt. d (1998).
92. See id. § 5 cmt. a (1998); Mitchell v. Sky Climber Inc., 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass.
1986).
93. See, e.g., Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 632-33 (N.J. 1996).
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5(b) (1998).
95. See Zaza, 675 A.2d at 629-30.
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and knowledge of the relevant risks, is unclear.9 6 But the general rule
against watchdog responsibility for component parts manufacturers is
solid.97
The rationales most often advanced for this no-duty rule should by now
be familiar to the reader. The Restatement, Third, of Torts: Products
Liability expresses them this way:
As a general rule, component sellers should not be liable when the
component itself is not defective as defined in this Chapter. If the
component is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to
impose liability solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the
integrated product utilizes the component in a manner that renders the
integrated product defective. Imposing liability would require the
component seller to scrutinize another's product which the component
seller has no role in developing. This would require the component seller
to develop sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of the business
entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated
product.
98
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explains:
To impose responsibility on the supplier of the compnent part in the
context of the larger defectively designed machine system would simply
extend liability too far. This would mean that suppliers would be required
to hire machine design experts to scrutinize machine systems that the
supplier had no role in developing. Suppliers would be forced to provide
modifications and attach warnings on machines that they never designed
nor manufactured. Mere suppliers cannot be expected to guarantee the
safety of other manufacturers' machinery. 99
C. Some General Observations
The preceding descriptions of traditional caselaw, drawn non-
exhaustively from both outside and inside the products liability system,
demonstrate quite clearly that courts generally refuse to require actors to
perform watchdog functions in order to rescue would-be victims from risks
created and controlled by others. Even when the would-be rescuers'
conduct is linked causally to placing the would-be victims in need of
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt. b (1998).
97. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 11, at 537 ("The rule set forth in § 5 is firnly
established in American law.").
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt. a (1998).
99. See Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701, 704 (8th Cir. 1993).
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rescue;100 and even when the would-be rescuers are arguably in a position to
render assistance by warning the victims;' 0' courts have refused to compel
such rescue-by-warning efforts because the courts have perceived that such
an imposition would be both unfair and ineffective. 0 2 In connection with
the cases of interest in this article-variations on the earlier swimsuit
hypothetical in which victims seek to hold the sellers of safe products liable
for failing to warn of the risks presented entirely by other, more dangerous
products-the preceding descriptions of traditional caselaw strongly
support judicial rejection of such claims. Part IV, which follows directly,
provides a policy analysis of why courts should reject these rescue-by-
warning claims.
IV. REQUIRING SELLERS OF SAFE PRODUCTS TO RESCUE USERS OF
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS CONSTITUTES BAD PUBLIC POLICY
A. Relying on Failure to Warn As the Doctrinal Vehicle for
Accomplishing Rescue Is Unfortunate
Although the reported decisions that prompt this article involve failure
to warn of risks of asbestos exposure, some of the rescues of which this
article speaks could be accomplished by product design modifications.
Thus, the pumps and valves to which asbestos products are applied post-
distribution might conceivably be redesigned to discourage such post-sale
applications of asbestos, or to reduce the risks they create. 103 But clearly,
redesigning swimsuits to discourage diving into shallow above-ground
pools would not be feasible. It is, therefore, not surprising that plaintiffs in
the rescue case of interest here rely on claims of failure to warn. The very
ease with which these rescue-by-warning claims may be formulated belies
how inherently problematic they really are. The author of this article has
elsewhere described failure-to-warn doctrine as an empty shell of rhetoric
that does not give courts adequate basis on which to distinguish spurious
claims from valid ones. 10 4  It is easy for a plaintiff to assert that, if an
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
101. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
103. For example, the product surfaces might be designed to make application of asbestos
more difficult, or to somehow contain the asbestos particles before they become air-borne. The
author assumes these possibilities are far-fetched.
104. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990).
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inherently safe pump or valve had carried warnings about the risks of
asbestos that may be attached by purchasers post-sale, the plaintiff would
have heeded the warnings and avoided exposure. Evidence of the wishful
thinking behind such an assertion is to be found in the fact that many
jurisdictions deem it necessary to supply plaintiffs with "heeding
presumptions" in order to render such claims facially plausible. 105
These heeding presumptions, which have been confusing and
controversial,10 6 lie near the heart of the difficulties with failure-to-warn
doctrine in the present context. To return to the swimsuit hypothetical, is it
realistic to presume that a swimsuit manufacturer could somehow reach its
purchaser/users with a warning against diving that would overcome the
other considerations-including daredevil impulses-that would lead an
individual to dive head first into shallow water?'0 7 Or that placing warnings
on pumps and valves would somehow convince an entire industry to refuse
to use insulating materials that had been traditionally used, were relatively
cheap and readily available, and that had proven very effective as fire
retardants? 0 8  Failure-to-warn doctrine allows defendants to raise these
questions, but almost always leaves them for the triers of fact to decide.' 09
It must be borne in mind that these difficulties inhere in the application of
failure-to-warn doctrine in all contexts, 10 not just in the one of primary
interest here. But when these difficulties are placed side-by-side with the
historical reality that courts in many different contexts have refused to
impose watchdog responsibilities on commercial actors to rescue victims
from risks created and controlled by others,'' plaintiffs in these rescue-by-
105. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 11, at 391-400.
106. See, e.g., Karen L. Bohmholdt, Note, The Heeding Presumption and Its Application:
Distinguishing No Warning from Inadequate Warning, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 461, 461-62 (2003);
Richard C. Heinke, The Heeding Presumption in Failure to Warn Cases: Opening Pandora 's
Box?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 174, 174-75 (1999); Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killoran, Liriano
v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious Dangers, The Duty to Warn of Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding
Presumption, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 717, 717-18 (1999).
107. The author's problems with this rhetorical question are set forth in HENDERSON &
TWERSKI, supra note 11, at 402-03.
108. The plaintiff might be better off arguing that, if the warnings had been given, he would
have quite a well paying job rather than continue to expose himself to the marginally increased
risks of pump-related asbestos in an environment already contaminated with asbestos from other
sources. Such a hypothesis strikes the author as so fantastically unrealistic that what must be
happening is that the plaintiff is, in actual fact, seeking strict, fault-free enterprise liability. Cf
infra notes 114-19, and accompanying text.
109. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 104, at 306. ("[T]he plaintiffs prima facie case [of
causation] is too easy to establish [and] the tools available to defendants to rebut it are almost
nonexistent.").
110. See supra Part III.
111. See supra Part III.
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warning cases of the swimsuit and pump/valve variety should bear a heavy
burden of showing that sound public policies support the outcomes they
seek. The following section reveals that quite the opposite is true.
B. Legitimate Public Policy Objectives Would Not Be Served by Imposing
These Duties to Rescue
Requiring sellers of safe products to rescue users of other, more
dangerous products would not serve to achieve the policy goals of
allocative efficiency or fundamental fairness. 1 2 Regarding the instrumental
objective of promoting the efficient allocation of resources, such a
requirement in the form of a duty to warn of risks entirely created and
controlled by other manufacturers would be too open-ended and vague to
serve as a meaningful guide to a seller's conduct. In the swimsuit
hypothetical, for example, would the swimsuit manufacturer also be
required to warn of the risks of running around a wet and slippery pool
deck? Or swimming at a beach that might be subject to deadly undertows?
Or sharks? Should the swimsuit manufacturer be required to warn of the
risks of swimming on a full stomach? Or while drunk? And regarding
sellers of pumps and valves, should they also warn of the dangers of
installing the pumps in unseaworthy vessels? Or in vessels that may
become contaminated with contagious disease? These are not far-fetched
possibilities, were courts to recognize a duty to warn of risks that originate
from, and are controlled entirely by, sources other than the defendant seller
of the inherently safe product. Combining this indeterminancy with the
serious questions regarding whether warnings really make a difference in
people's behaviors,' a what emerges is a regime of de facto enterprise
liability, in which failure-to-warn is a means by which to shift costs from
one enterprise to another in order to achieve social objectives having no
necessary connection with modifying user behavior." 
4
The author of this article has argued elsewhere that enterprise liability
on a grand scale is unworkable and inefficient, even when the risks that
result in injury can be traced to the enterprise being held strictly liable." 15
112. See supra note 18.
113. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
114. If one assumes that warnings in these settings do not actually reduce accident costs
significantly, and that plaintiffs almost always reach triers of fact with failure-to-warn claims, see
supra note 109, then the defendants' liability amounts to strict enterprise liability based on the fact
of distributing products that contribute in attenuated, cause-in-fact ways, see supra notes 10, 32, to
causing plaintiffs to be harmed.
115. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377
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In much more constrained forms, enterprise liability may be justifiable as a
means of making sure that enterprises that create risks bear their fair share
of the social costs that those risks generate.' 16 But in the present context,
when a court holds the seller of a safe product strictly liable for the harm
caused entirely by more dangerous products, the relevant social costs are
not allocated to the appropriate enterprise. Users and consumers of the safe
product under such a regime end up compensating (and thereby
subsidizing) the users and consumers of the dangerous products, thereby
generally discouraging use and consumption of relatively safe products and
encouraging use and consumption of relatively dangerous ones. The end
result is that extending failure-to-warn doctrine to effect the rescue of users
and consumers of dangerous products will not promote efficiency, but
rather the opposite. Unless they have some other instrumental objective in
mind, such as providing asbestos victims with a source of funding
regardless of how unprincipled the means of doing so," 7 courts should not
think seriously about extending these duties to warn in the name of
promoting allocative efficiency.
Even if extending these duties to warn will not promote allocative
efficiency-indeed, will probably prove wasteful-what of the non-
instrumental goal of achieving fairness and justice between the parties?
The author of this article has elsewhere identified three fairness values that
products liability may be seen to promote: (1) compensating victims of
defective products for the disappointment of their reasonable expectations;
(2) requiring those who deliberately appropriate the well-being of others to
make their victims whole; and (3) shifting the social costs of risky activities
from the innocent victims of those activities to those who directly benefit
from them. 118 Taken together, promoting these values helps to achieve
corrective justice. The unifying principle is that those whose self-
promoting activities cause harm to others should compensate their victims
in order to make them whole and set things right. How do these principles
of corrective justice inform an assessment of the proposed extension of
failure-to-warn doctrine to require sellers of safe products to rescue victims
of other, more dangerous products? Upon reflection, they argue against
imposing such liability. As both the swimsuit and the pump/valves
(2002).
116. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and
Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958 (2002).
117. It should be remembered that the decisions that prompted this article, which is
deliberately couched in more general terms, are asbestos cases. See supra note 7.
118. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REv. 919, 935-38 (1981).
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examples make clear, the sellers of the relatively safe products have not
deliberately or actively caused harm to the victims, nor have they unjustly
enriched themselves (or their customer bases) at the victims' expense.
Indeed, given the roles of the defendants as non-rescuers in these examples,
it is difficult to conceptualize these cases in corrective-justice terms. It
follows that the only policy justification for imposing this kind of duty to
rescue must be instrumental-even if the sellers of the safe products do not
ethically deserve to be held liable, threatening them with liability will cause
them effectively to rescue victims from injury. On this view, the defendant
product sellers must be seen instrumentally as a means of achieving
efficiency. But this brings the analysis full circle-imposing what amounts
to strict liability in these cases will not promote efficiency. Once this
efficiency rationale is revealed as a false promise, hope for a public policy
justification for extending the duty to rescue by warning vanishes.
To this point the policy discussion has focused on what might be
termed "nearly pure" rescue claims, where the safe product does not
combine synergistically with the more dangerous product to produce joint
risks.1 20 When such synergism does occur, the policy arguments supporting
liability are much stronger. From an instrumental standpoint, a failure-to-
warn regime based on synergistic interaction is more workable because the
synergism identifies the risks to be warned about, significantly reducing the
open-endedness of the duty to warn that courts would encounter in the
absence of synergism.1 2' And from a fairness perspective, it is easier when
synergism occurs to say that the relatively safe product, itself (apart from
any failure to warn), is significantly contributing to causing the victim's
injuries. 22 When the post-distribution, synergistic creation of risk results
from purchaser/manufacturers subsequently combining components to
119. These are the essential difficulties of making out an ethical case for imposing a "nearly
pure" duty to rescue. The defendant is liable for something it did not do, not something it did do.
For ethical arguments supporting a duty to rescue on non-instrumental grounds, see Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical
Community ofAid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1 (1993). For arguments against a duty to rescue, see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
120. For a discussion of "pure" and "nearly pure" rescue, see supra note 25.
121. Earlier discussions have rehearsed the virtually limitless range of risks about which a
swimsuit or a pump manufacturer might be required to warn in the absence of any requirement of
synergism. See supra text following note 112. The earlier example of the swimsuit disintegrating
caustically in high-chlorine-content pool water, see supra text preceding note 17, makes this clear.
The required warning in that instance would focus on the effects of chlorine, not a limitless
number of other risks.
122. In the example of the caustic interaction of the swimsuit and the chlorine, the swimsuit is
an active participant in causing the dangerous synergism.
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produce an integrated end-product, traditionally courts hold the component
seller liable for end-product defects only if it substantially participates in
the combining of the components. 23  This limitation on a component
seller's liability appears consistent with the preceding policy analysis, from
both efficiency and fairness perspectives.
124
C. Working Out a No-Duty Rule to Cover These Rescue-by- Warning
Claims
This section assumes that strong lines of precedent and careful
considerations of public policy support judicial rejection of claims requiring
sellers of relatively safe products to rescue users and consumers from risks
presented entirely by other, more dangerous products. 125 It remains to work
out a sufficiently clear no-duty rule that will allow courts to dispose of such
claims as a matter of law. 12 6 Mindful of the admonitions of Part II about
avoiding oversimplified, dismissive rules of decision, 2 7 the author offers
the following first effort at formulating an appropriate no-duty rule: a
commercial product seller owes no duty to design or warn against the risks
presented by other products with which the seller's product interacts after
sale or distribution unless either (1) the seller participates actively and
substantially in causing the interaction to occur, or (2) the post-sale
interaction synergistically creates joint risks that are significantly greater
than the sum of the risks that the product and the other products would
present independently. If either or both of the exceptions apply, the rules
generally governing negligence and product defectiveness determine
liability.
This approach is not offered as a proposed revision of the Restatement
of Products Liability, on which the author served as Co-Reporter. 128  At
most, some of the proffered language might have been included in official
comments. 129  It will be noted that the proposal might be phrased,
123. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
124. Substantial participation in the integration of the components implies control by the
component seller, which supports instrumental objectives. And the participation makes the
component part supplier an active contributor to the risk, strengthening noninstrumental
arguments based on corrective justice.
125. See supra Parts II, III.B.
126. In general, no-duty rules should provide clear guidelines based on considerations other
than the policy objectives, themselves. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM, § 7 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft 2005).
127. See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 10-15.
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
129. Perhaps it might have been to § 2(c), dealing with the basic subject of failure to warn, id.
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alternatively, in "product defectiveness" language, leaving courts to fit it
into the conceptual framework of their products liability law.' 30 Note also
that the proposal covers both rescue by warning and rescue by design, a
point raised earlier in this discussion.' 31 The most important aspect of this
proposed no-duty rule is that the vast majority of products liability claims
will come within one or both of the two exceptions-the cases that the no-
duty rule covers will presumably be few in number, perhaps limited to
asbestos claims depending on whether other courts decide to follow the
recent decisions of the Washington Supreme Court.1
32
Perhaps the most efficient way to understand what the proposed rule
would accomplish is to walk through some illustrative cases to see how
they would come out. For example, how would a court respond to the
swimsuit hypothetical considered at various junctures in this analysis?
Clearly, the proposed no-duty rule would require judgment as a matter of
law for the swimsuit manufacturer. Although swimsuit distributors
promote swimming generally, they do not promote diving into shallow
water, the dangerous interaction in that case; even if swimsuit
manufacturers know that such conduct occurs, they do not actively
participate in causing it to occur. 133  Moreover, as explained earlier, the
swimsuit and the swimming pool do not interact synergistically. 34  The
same outcome would result in the pump/asbestos cases. Pump
manufacturers may know that asbestos will be applied post-sale within and
without their products, but this analysis assumes that the manufacturers do
not actively participate in causing that to occur.' 35 And the pumps and the
asbestos do not interact synergistically to create "significantly greater" joint
risks. 1
36
§ 2(c), or § 5, dealing with component parts that get combined to create integrated end-products,
id. § 5. The author would have preferred the first alternative, since these cases do not fit easily
into the component parts paradigm.
130. The Restatement (Third) of Torts sections dealing with time-of-sale failure to warn rely
on defectiveness rather than distributor's negligence. But the reasonableness-based tests for
liability for design and marketing defects are functionally equivalent to negligence. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998) (The provisions governing
design and warning defects "achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated on
negligence.").
131. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
132. See Braaten, 2008 WL 5175083; Simonetta, 2008 WL 5175068.
133. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying note 119.
136. See supra text following note 22. There, the text speaks of asbestos applied to the outside
of the pumps. What of asbestos-containing gaskets installed post-sale inside the pumps? On the
assumption that the asbestos becomes dangerous only when disturbed during servicing, the
defendant can argue persuasively that any small degree of synergism between the pumps and the
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What about the majority of products liability claims that do (and
should) fall within the exceptions-the claims that the proposed no-duty
rule should not bar? The earlier hypothetical involving the swimsuit that
interacts dangerously with high-chlorine-content pool water is easy-the
products interact synergistically under the second exception and plaintiff is
free to invoke design and warning principles in seeking recovery.' 37 What
about a claim that the manufacturer of an automobile should warn users
about driving while intoxicated? One's first reaction may be that the
proposed no-duty rule bars the claim because it is similar to the claim in the
swimsuit/diving and pump/asbestos cases. Upon reflection, that reaction
will be seen to be in error. Drunkenness and automobile driving are poster
children for dangerous synergistic interaction; the combination of the two
product-related activities creates joint risks that are "significantly greater"
than the sum of the risks that the activities present independently. If the
reader nevertheless believes that such a failure-to-warn claim is weak, it is
probably because the risks of drunk driving are well-known and plainly
obvious, and no duty to warn exists for that reason. 138 But observe that
even obvious risks may require modifications in product design-although
courts and other regulators have not required automobile manufacturers to
design their products to reduce the frequency of drunk driving, it is at least
conceivable that they might.
139
How does the proposed no-duty rule interface with the problem of
determining a component part manufacturer's responsibility for
dangerously designed end-products? It will be recalled from an earlier
discussion that sellers of non-defective components are liable for the
dangerous designs of integrated end-products only when the sellers
substantially participate in the integrative design process. 140 However, even
if a component seller does not actively participate in integrating its product
into the end-design, its component may nevertheless combine
synergistically with the other components, falling within the second
exception to the proposed no-duty rule. But then the separate no-duty rule
governing non-participating component suppliers kicks in, and the
component seller would be off the liability hook as a matter of law. Thus,
courts should first apply the proposed no-duty rule and, if a defendant seller
gaskets does not create joint risks that are significantly greater than if the asbestos had been
applied externally to the pumps.
137. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 131. On the subject of anti-drunk-driving
devices in automobiles, see JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 550 (4th ed. 2000).
140. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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comes within an exception, move to the further question of whether another
no-duty rule applies to warrant judgment for defendant as a matter of law.
V. CONCLUSION
A manufacturer's duty to provide reasonable warnings and to adopt
reasonably safe designs ordinarily does not involve rescue. 141 Thus, when a
defectively designed or marketed product interacts synergistically with
products manufactured by others, the commercial distributor of the
defective product is liable for misfeasance, not nonfeasance. In these
routine situations, the manufacturer is being held liable for harm its
unreasonably dangerous product actively causes, not for harm that the
manufacturer has failed to prevent. By contrast, the cases of interest in this
article, wherein the sellers of nondefective products are required to warn or
design against risks that are entirely generated by unsafe products with
which their products happen to interact non-synergistically, do involve
rescue in a very real sense.1 42 In these cases, the seller of the safe product is
held for nonfeasance, not misfeasance-for failing to rescue users of its
inherently safe products from risks that its products did not actively
contribute to creating. 
143
This article has considered two concrete examples of product-
interaction, rescue-by-warning products liability claims: one purely
hypothetical-a swimsuit manufacturer's alleged duty to warn swimsuit
users against the risks of diving into shallow, above-ground swimming
pools; and one quite real-a pump manufacturer's alleged duty to warn its
users of the risks presented entirely by asbestos products added to its pumps
only after purchase and installation. The preceding analysis demonstrates
that imposing liability on either the swimsuit manufacturer or the pump
manufacturer runs counter to a strong bias in traditional American liability
law against requiring one group of actors to function as watchdogs to
prevent another group of actors from wrongfully causing harm. And this
analysis shows that imposing liability of this sort constitutes bad public
policy. In response to these difficulties, this article proposes a no-duty rule
that will enable courts to sort out these product-interaction, rescue-by-
warning claims, one that would properly dispose of the swimsuit/diving and
the pump/asbestos claims for defendants as a matter of law while allowing
more sensible product-interaction claims to reach triers of fact. Simply
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text following note 36.
143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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stated, the proposed rule recognizes product-interaction claims when either
the seller actively and substantially participates in causing the product
interaction to occur, or the product interaction synergistically creates
significant joint risks of harm.
To date, courts have not allowed plaintiffs to proceed with product-
interaction, rescue-by-warning claims, 144 but some of these cases are still
under review.145  If future courts choose to impose liability in these
situations and these holdings catch on and spread, courts may eventually be
involved in an unprecedented, unfortunate expansion of the duty to rescue.
This author predicts that such an expansion will not occur. Most judges
will understand what their predecessors have always understood-that
hanging liability on such a slender thread does not promote the efficient
allocation of resources, nor does it achieve justice among the parties
involved.
144. See Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 2008 WL 5175083 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2008);
Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 2008 WL 5175068 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2008); cf Lindstrom v. A-C Prod.
Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005) (Ohio law).
145. See Taylor v. A.W. Chesterton, Nos. A 116816 and A 117648 (Cal. App. 1st Div.); Merrill
v. Leslie Controls, Inc., No. B200006 (Cal. App. 2d Div.).
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